INTRODUCTION
More than any other provision in the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter 'ECHR' or 'Convention'), the concise reference to a 'right to respect for family life' in Article 8 has given rise to a multiplicity of practical applications in Strasbourg litigation, ranging from human fertilisation and embryology legislation to rules governing married couples' choice of family name, and from parental leave entitlements to family reunification claims in immigration proceedings (Draghici, 2017: 30-36 and passim). Moreover, due to the purposive interpretation of the notion of 'family life' by the ECHR monitoring bodies, the relationships caught by Article 8 have gone so far as to encompass aspiring parents and children formally adopted abroad but with whom they had never lived, 1 a transsexual and a child biologically unrelated to him born through assisted reproduction to a partner with whom he had no legal ties 2 as well as public foster carers and unrelated looked-after children. 3 Despite this elasticity of Article 8, one category of familial ties that has remained outside its scope is the relationship between adult children and their (often ageing)
parents. For the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter 'ECtHR' or 'the Court'), family life appears to suffer a hiatus after the children reach majority until such time as elderly parents become their children's 'dependents' in the narrowest of terms. 4 This article maintains that the overemphasis on the nuclear family made up of parents and minor dependent children (or social groups emulating that model) 5 is a regrettable anomaly in the Strasbourg jurisprudence, and is at odds with the Court's own criteria for defining 'family life', as well as with the reality of everyday family arrangements. The next section examines Strasbourg cases concerning adult children and their parents and criticises the unrealistically high threshold of dependency required in order to engage Article 8, largely confined to disability. The author notes that the judicial approach described has been developed in the politically sensitive area of immigration proceedings (with the notable exception of second-generation migrants awaiting deportation, treated more sympathetically by the Court) 6 and hypothesizes that the narrow meaning of 'family life' in that context might be a result of judicial pragmatism. 7 This stream of case-law is contrasted with the landmark cases on the scope of Article 8, including 'signposts' such as biological affiliation corroborated by effective social ties and the recognition of close bonds with near relatives (grandparents and collateral ascendants). 8 The article further argues that there is a notable gap between the social understanding of 'family life' in European countries and the legal understanding of 'family life' under Article 8 ECHR according to the meaning attributed to it in Strasbourg. To that end, it relies on the notion of 'family' in the sociological literature as a group defined not by strict dependency but rather by a shared identity, as well as caring and economic cooperation, including financial support, domestic labour and sometimes co-residence. 9 Against this background, the conclusions suggest that a more appropriate reading of the right to 'respect for family life' under Article 8 is that State obligations may vary depending on the nature of the family bonds at stake; however, an interpretation failing to acknowledge the relationship between parents and their adult children as 'family life' altogether is excessively restrictive and does not reflect social reality. Far from being a merely doctrinal issue, the acceptance of parents and adult children as falling within the ambit of Article 8 would entail judicial scrutiny over measures interfering with the normal development of their relationship, placing the burden on State authorities to justify prima facie violations.
II. THE EXCLUSION OF PARENTS AND THEIR ADULT CHILDREN FROM THE PROTECTION OF ARTICLE 8

Family life predicated on dependency
The exclusion of the relationship between parents and their adult children from the protection of Article 8 can be traced back to the 1984 decision of the now defunct European Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter 'ECmHR' or 'the Commission') in S and S v United Kingdom. 10 The case regarded the British authorities' refusal to allow an Indian woman to re-join her adult son in the UK after an extended visit to India, although she had previously shared a residence with her son for several years in the UK and she had produced medical evidence of mental health issues, in particular depression and anxiety, exacerbated by the separation from her son. The Commission declared the complaint ill-founded on the following ground:
'Generally, the protection of family life under Article 8 involves cohabiting dependents, such as parents and their dependent, minor children. Whether it extends to other relationships depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Relationships between [adult relatives] would not necessarily acquire the protection of Article 8 of the Convention without evidence of further elements of dependency, involving more than the normal, emotional ties.'
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The immediate consequence of restricting the notion of 'family life' to the nuclear family and establishing a high threshold for dependency between adult relatives is that claims brought by parents and their adult children are destined to fail at the admissibility stage, without allowing for a proper inquiry into the nature, rationale and proportionality of the alleged interference. Grand Chamber in Slivenko v Latvia later provided a restatement of the S and S principle, emphasizing the distinction between the 'core family' and other family members, as well as the notion of dependency:
'the existence of "family life" could not be relied on by the applicants in relation to [their] elderly parents, adults who did not belong to the core family and who have not been shown to have been dependent members of the applicants' family…'. 13 This wording was replicated in subsequent cases, for instance Sisojeva and others v Latvia and
Shevanova v Latvia.
14 The Court appeared to show some hesitation in Omojudi v UK; since the respondent government had conceded that the applicant's deportation interfered with his family life with his wife and two youngest children, the Court found it 'unnecessary to decide whether the close bond which the applicant undoubtedly had with his eldest son and his granddaughter was itself sufficient to give rise to family life between them'. 15 Moreover, the Court seemed to suggest that family life did exist with the adult child and the grandchild when it proceeded to apply its usual 'insurmountable obstacles' test to ascertain if family life could be recreated elsewhere. 16 However, this appears to be a mere ad abundantiam argument, as the Court had already determined that there were insurmountable obstacles to the relocation abroad of the applicant's minor children born in the The threshold was emphatically presented as narrow, without further guidance as to what qualifies as a particular dependency. In some cases, the Court concludes that there was no dependency but glosses over the issue without providing a detailed assessment. For instance, in Samsonnikov v Estonia, 19 the Court merely stated that no family life existed between the applicant and his father and brother without engaging with the applicant's submission; it had been alleged that the relationship between the applicant and his ageing father was based on financial support and mutual aid, 20 and the government's rebuttal was limited to the observation that they lived separately. 21 Considering that in other cases the Court had made it clear that co-residence is not dispositive of the issue of whether family life exists, 22 28 The applicant in this case was a young Ugandan woman who had arrived in the UK on a fraudulent passport and subsequently applied for asylum unsuccessfully. She had resided with her aunt, her only surviving relation, for over eight years, while her immigration status remained uncertain, relying on her aunt for financial as well as emotional support, as she suffered from anxiety and depression. In Emonet v Switzerland, 29 a non-immigration case, the Court also found 'family life' engaged on account of the adult child's disability. The latter case regarded a 30-year-old paraplegic woman who depended on the care and support of her mother and her mother's former cohabitant, whom she regarded as a father. All parties had agreed that the man ought to adopt her in order to consolidate their relationship in the eyes of the law; however, the unintended effect of the adoption order, challenged in domestic and Strasbourg proceedings, was that it extinguished the mother's parental status. In deciding that Article 8 applied to the relationship between the parties, the Court noted that additional factors of dependence other than normal ties of affection existed, due to the constant care required by the adult child.
The commonalities between the cases of Emonet, F.N. and Anam would suggest that in practice nothing short of disability (mental or physical, typically of the descendant) can persuade the Court that dependency between adult relatives has been substantiated. This stance amounts to saying that the Convention law only assimilates vulnerable adult children to family members, by unuttered analogy with minors. Equating 'family life' with disability-induced vulnerability is on any view a very narrow understanding of the substance of familial association.
Adult relatives as 'private life'-a doubtful concession
In a number of cases regarding challenges to deportation orders, adult long-term residents (usually migrants arrived in the host country at a very young age) have been able to invoke their family life with relatives other than partners or minor children, in particular with parents and adult siblings. In Nasri v France, the alien subject to a deportation order for criminal conduct was hearing impaired and unable to speak, illiterate and with no command of any sign language, and had always lived with his parents; 30 in accepting the applicability of Article 8, the Court made no reference to its earlier restrictive approach in S and S to adult relatives, but emphasized that 'for a person confronted with such obstacles, the family is especially important, not only in terms of providing a home, but also because it can help to prevent him from lapsing into a life of crime'. 31 In
Boughanemi v France, 32 'family life'. 38 Indeed for second-generation migrants, private life and family life appear indistinguishable at times. In Üner v The Netherlands, another case regarding a challenge to an expulsion order, the Court was prepared to recognize that the 'totality of social ties between settled migrants and the community in which they are living constitute part of the concept of "family life"'. 39 The scholarship has explained the more protective approach to Article 8 in such cases as driven by a concern to safeguard the individual's private life in the host country, which is a broader concept. According to Cholewinski, 'some of the considerations which the Strasbourg organs viewed as outweighing the legitimate aim of the deporting authorities had little relevance to family life'; in fact, the judicial agenda was 'based on the premise that second-generation migrants … should effectively be treated as de facto citizens, with the result that expulsion from their country of residence can hardly ever be justified' (Cholewinski, 1994: 298) . Thym has similarly argued that the protection afforded in deportation cases involving second-generation migrants is actually less connected to the family life of the applicants and more to their private life, even if the Court does not renounce the reference to family links (Thym, 2014: 114) . 40 In several recent pronouncements (Slivenko v Latvia, Shevanova v Latvia, Sarközi and Mahran v Austria), the Court refined its stance on this matter and explicitly shifted the attention to private life, accepting that relationships between adult relatives 'may be protected under the notion of "private life" for the purposes of Article 8, depending on the degree of social integration of the persons concerned'. 41 In all those cases, the applicants were long-term residents who already had extensive 'private life' ties in the host country, sometimes forged after decades of residence, and Moreover, there is a bizarre inequity in the Court's preferential approach to relationships between adult relatives in cases regarding the proposed deportation of second-generation migrants.
Whereas integrated aliens may successfully invoke such relationships to challenge a deportation order following criminal convictions, often for violent offences (Boughanemi, Nasri), a less favourable treatment is applied to law-abiding naturalized citizens who wish to be joined by a foreign parent requiring care (Senchishak) 42 or children left behind in the country of origin (Kwakye-nti and Dufie). 43 In the latter cases, the Court pays no attention to the social ties that naturalized citizens would lose in their adoptive home country if required to relocate in order to maintain substantial contact with children having reached majority or to look after their elderly parents. From a private life perspective, such citizens or long-term residents stand to lose just as much as second-generation migrants if compelled to move to be able to pursue family interests.
Moreover, this double standard suggests that an individual loses 'family life' ties with the original family simply by virtue of crossing a border.
Arguably, the normalcy of a citizen's (or settled resident's) family life comprises the ability to maintain reasonable contact with their children after they reach majority and to provide care for their ageing parents. Moreover, the focus in Strasbourg proceedings should not be exclusively on the rights of the alien seeking leave to enter or remain, but also on those of the resident or citizen with whom they have, or wish to resume, family life. Carens has aptly emphasized the moral obligation a State has towards citizens or lawful residents to consider their right to family life with relatives seeking entry, even though the latter are not yet within the State's jurisdiction and therefore not entitled to protection themselves:
'The state's obligation to admit family members living elsewhere is derived not so much from the claims of those seeking to enter as the claims of those they seek to join: citizens or residents or others who have been admitted for an extended period' (Carens, 2013 : 186, emphasis added).
The generalized acknowledgement of family relationships between adult children and their parents as falling within the scope of Article 8 would correct the imbalance in the Court's approach to cases regarding family reunion as opposed to removal of settled immigrants.
An immigration-specific notion of 'family life'?
It is apparent from the overview of the case-law undertaken so far that the issue of whether or not 'the Court cannot ignore that the present case is concerned not only with family life but also with immigration and that, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to its treaty obligations, a State has the right to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory'. 44 Occasionally, the Court itself seemed to recognize that it attributes a specific meaning to the notion of 'family life' (almost exclusively applicable to the core family) in the context of immigrationrelated cases. In Slivenko v Latvia it expressly circumscribed its understanding of 'family life' to the substantive area at hand:
'In the Convention case-law relating to expulsion and extradition measures, the main emphasis has consistently been placed on the "family life" aspect, which has been interpreted as encompassing the effective "family life" established in the territory of a Contracting State by aliens lawfully resident there, it being understood that "family life" in this sense is normally limited to the core family'. 'The Court has indeed previously rejected cases involving failed applications for family reunion and complaints under Article 8 where the children concerned had in the meantime reached an age where they were presumably not as much in need of care as young children and increasingly able to fend for themselves'.
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It is also worth noting that in cases involving minor children left behind, although the Court usually does find Article 8 engaged, it concludes that the parent's new State of residence has no obligation to allow those concerned to enjoy a more substantial degree of family life on its territory than the one the parent voluntarily chose when relocating abroad. alien who poses a threat to the community or would be a burden on the social security system, notwithstanding the presence of their parents or adult children on its territory. The Court may find that an elderly relative is likely to rely on the host State's health care system or that the adult child will have to give up work to act as a full-time carer, with implications for the economy of the host State, and hence limitations or the request of proof of financial capacity to meet the needs of the parent may be legitimate. However, the Court should be able to scrutinize decisions such as the refusal of a tourist visa for a family visit by the elderly parent who is not a dependant, or of the admission of an elderly parent who, without being financially dependent or disabled, is in advanced age and has no other family members to care for them in the country of origin (especially where the child with whom they seek reunification is a citizen or permanent resident of the requested country).
The Court's decision whether to accommodate the public policy considerations in Article 8 (2) should intervene at the second stage of the analysis, rather than through the refusal to entertain the case, deeming it outside the scope of the Convention.
III. THE CASE FOR A MORE INCLUSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF 'FAMILY LIFE' UNDER THE ECHR
Achieving greater consistency within Article 8 case-law
The aforementioned cases concerning adult child -(elderly) parent relationships reveal a particularly restrictive interpretation of 'family life' as limited to the nuclear family, 51 as well as biological children of a spouse (Söderbäck v Sweden) 52 or of a same-sex domestic partner (X v Austria). 53 The protection of Article 8 was further extended to the relationship between a man and his former adoptive child (Kurochkin v Ukraine) 54 and to the relationship between a biological father and his adulterous children in relation to whom the mother's husband was the legal father, insofar as the former was the actual caregiver (Chavdarov v Bulgaria). 55 donors who have never developed a personal relationship with the children born through assisted insemination to lesbian mothers (JRM v The Netherlands), 65 or former lovers seeking a declaration of paternity in respect of children born to married women, although the latter are marginally protected under the 'privacy' limb (Schneider v Germany, Ahrens v Germany). 66 The Court would therefore preserve the ability to perform a qualitative assessment of the relationship between adult relatives in order to determine if it amounts to 'family life'. By contrast, an a priori blanket exclusion, save for the most exceptional situations of dependency, means that the Court cannot conduct a case-by-case analysis, either as to whether the relationship amounts to family life or to decide if the interference was a proportionate one.
Kroon v The Netherlands, Merger and Cros v France, X and Y v Switzerland),
A further argument in favour of a more expansive interpretation of 'family life' is provided by the stream of case-law regarding DNA testing for adult applicants desirous of establishing paternity. Albeit focused on private life, it suggests that family association is centred around a shared identity and transcends a person's minority. In Jäggi v Switzerland, the Court thus found that the interest in discovering one's parentage did not disappear with age. 67 The Menéndez García v Spain decision further indicates that the need to establish grand-paternity is also covered by Article 8, although a lesser degree of protection is available under the Convention, insofar as States retain a wider margin of appreciation. 68 According to the Court, the interest in knowing one's identity varies depending on the degree of kinship in the ascending line, with parents being of the highest importance, whereas the weight of such interest in relation to grandparents diminishes. Affiliation between an individual and their ascendants corresponds therefore to a life-long interest affecting the most personal sphere of anyone's identity, and this continued relationship in adulthood should also be reflected in the understanding of 'family life'.
Finally, the Court has recognized that, where a child is born of a marital or de facto union, from the moment of the child's birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between child and parents a bond amounting to 'family life'; 69 subsequent events may break that relationship, 'but only exceptional circumstances can warrant the conclusion that the tie between a parent and his or her child is severed'. 70 It should not be a foregone conclusion that a child's coming of age brings "family life" to an end.
Bridging the gap between legal and sociological perspectives on the family
The 'For me, "family" is one way to describe forms or expressions of intimate or private living based upon care and interdependence. … What makes a relationship familial to me then is not necessarily a biological, legal, or conjugal connection, rather it is what people do in it, it is a relationship characterized by some degree of intimacy, interdependence, and care.' (Diduck, 2011 : 289, emphasis added).
A Czech qualitative study conducted on school teachers indicated that, in order to explain the concept of family, most respondents would refer to descriptors which can be organised into seven categories: social roles ('partnership'/ 'raising children'/ 'generation'/ 'lineage'), emotions ('wellbeing'/ 'security'/ 'trust'/ 'emotional needs'), responsibilities ('organisation'/ 'contribution'/ 'work'), being together ('cooperation'/ 'sharing'/ 'belonging together'/ 'coexistence'), economics ('housekeeping'/ 'management'/ 'material security'), leisure ('spending free time together') and care ('protection'/ 'support'/ 'relying on one another') (Havigerová et al, 2013 (Havigerová et al, : 2511 (Havigerová et al, -2512 ). None of these terms -which overlap with the core of family practices described in the two definitions reproduced above -apply to the nuclear family exclusively. The relationships between children, parents and grandparents are equally characterised by care, sharing and contribution.
Although it is primarily during their minority that children are dependent upon their parents, the latter continue to be a significant part of their adult children's network of emotional and economic support. For instance, Herring pointed out that in the UK grandparents are the most important source of pre-school care after parents, and that according to a recent survey 44 per cent of children were receiving regular care from grandparents (Herring, 2015: 721) . A study conducted by Douglas and Ferguson showed that mothers who work outside the home rely mainly on grandparents for the provision of childcare, a phenomenon all the more conspicuous given the significant growth in mothers' employment rates over the past few decades (Douglas and Ferguson, 2003: 42) . For post-divorce family structures, grandparents are a crucial source of financial, emotional and childcare support, sometimes during the transition inherent in reorganising family life, but often also as a long-term solution; this is accompanied by both grandparents' sense of obligation to assist and their children's expectation to be offered assistance (Ferguson et al, 2004: 103-108, 118). Moreover, sociological research on family background and educational success carried out in the US has revealed that grandparents play a distinctive role in the rearing of grandchildren; Jaeger has thus argued that the effect of family background on educational success is not solely explained by the influence of the immediate family (the parents' generation), but is to a considerable extent ascribed to the extended family (grandparents in particular) and to the interactions between these two environments (Jaeger, 2012: 918-9).
As well as continuing to be a resource for their adult children in terms of providing childcare and financial assistance, parents are also reliant on their adult children when they reach an advanced age. In his partly dissenting opinion in the Slivenko case, Judge Kovler pointed out that the extended family is profoundly anchored in the culture of East and Southern European societies, so much so that a number of jurisdictions (such as the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova) incorporate the obligation of adult children to support parents who are unfit to work in their fundamental laws. 71 This suggests that 'in those countries the tradition of helping one's elderly parents is firmly established as a moral imperative written into the Constitution'. 72 accepted that children owe a moral obligation to their elderly parents, even though the rationale might be obscure and a precise equivalent in a legal obligation may be absent (Herring, 2015: 725) .
The relationship between adult children and their parents is consequently best described in terms of mutuality, with valuable contributions and with vulnerabilities on both sides. Indeed, empirical studies suggest that the modern extended family, based on intergenerational care, whether or not within the same household, is a widespread social model (Bornat et al, 2004: 115-128) . To reflect that reality, interdependence (broadly defined) rather than unilateral and strict dependency ought to be the criterion governing the understanding of 'family life' in Strasbourg case-law.
Additionally, evidence of a special regime applying to adult children and their parents even when they operate as separate households can be found in certain aspects of domestic law. Thus, the presumption of advancement between parent and child at common law (which means inter alia that no resulting trust arises where a parent contributes to the purchase price of a home for their adult child) is predicated on the idea that parents and children continue to have a relationship governed by family law rather than general property rules (including equitable doctrines 'Giving precedence to the criterion of dependency to the detriment of that of normal affective ties strikes me as a very artificial approach to determining the existence of "family life". It seems inconceivable to me that so little importance can be attached to the affective ties between a mother and her son that they can fall outside the scope of "family life"'. 75 In light of all the above considerations, the Court's dismissive attitude towards emotional ties and intergenerational care as being conducive to 'family life' is inconsistent with social reality (and aspects of domestic laws reflecting and accommodating that reality). The dissenters in Senchishak v
Finland put forward a powerful critique of this standpoint, oblivious to the cycle of life and actual human experience:
'The notion of "core family" and the level of preserved emotional ties between parents and separated adult children vary across the cultures and traditions of Europe as well as among individuals living in various countries. … A time comes when elderly parents do need the loving care of their adult children and actually receive it as a matter of moral duty and preserved feelings of affection. To deny this is to hold that once an individual comes of age, the emotional ties with his or her parents are to be considered once and for all de facto and de jure severed and that for this reason neither a moral nor a legal duty to provide care may be said to exist between them. In our understanding this is incorrect in both legal and moral terms'. In fact, the Court tends to embrace a politicised assessment of the Convention law in immigration cases in general, including a proportionality test skewed in favour of the State, as a means to ensure that it does not alienate the contracting parties. 77 Regrettably, this also affects the very understanding of what constitutes family life for the purposes of Article 8. As Kilkelly noted, in purely domestic cases the Court has included wider categories of family members within the scope of this provision, whereas 'a strict line is taken on the existence of family life in immigration cases, particularly those involving family reunification, where the burden is on the applicant to establish that such a relationship exists' (Kilkelly, 1999: 217) . Even accepting the dependency nexus as necessary in order to create family life between adult relatives, the current assessment of dependency is too narrow to reflect normal family dynamics.
Significantly, the exceptional cases where the Court was prepared to find that nexus satisfied (Anam for the economic well-being of the community has been accepted as a legitimate ground for interference. 81 Once it has ascertained that immigration laws are not immune from human rights challenges, the Court should take a consistent approach in respect of adult children and their parents rather than treating them as strangers for the purposes of Article 8.
A reconsideration of this area of law is further warranted by the fact that 'population aging is a key feature of twenty-first-century demographic trends' (Murphy, 2017: 257 fulfil an important role in providing care to elderly persons', particularly in Southern Europe (Lyberaki et al, 2013: 8) . In countries, such as the UK, where the phenomenon of population ageing is accompanied by a stagnation or reduction in the level of public spending on elderly care, 
